

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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O P 172136Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2123  
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 00869

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM DICK MOOSE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PDEV RH UK  
SUBJECT: RHODESIA: SECOND MEETING WITH OWEN  
SUMMARY: WE CONTINUED, JANUARY 17, TO BUILD ON THE CONSENSUS DEVELOPED WITH DAVID OWEN YESTERDAY. WE AGREED THAT IN THE EVENT OF LITTLE OR NO SUCCESS IN OUR NAIROBI MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WE SHOULD MOVE ON QUICKLY TO THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS, EXPLAINING OUR PROPOSALS IN DETAIL AND STATING THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THEIR CONCERTED SUPPORT. WE ALSO

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AGREED THAT BEFORE THE NAIROBI MEETING WE SHOULD ALERT THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS AS WELL AS MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE TO THE PURPOSES OF SEEING THE PF. OWEN ACCEPTED OUR IDEA THAT CALLAGHAN SHOULD WRITE TO MACHEL EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HIS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. WE DID NOT FINALLY SETTLE HOW TO HANDLE SMITH, BUT AGREED HE TOO SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE MEETING WITH THE PF. AT

SOME LENGTH WE DISCUSSED THE NEED TO PRESENT OUR TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN A FASHION WHICH DEMONSTRATE A GENUINE AND IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER OF POWER TO INDEPENDENT MAJORITY RULE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ONE HOUR SESSION WITH CARVER AND GRAHAM THIS AFTERNOON, THE BRITISH GAVE US A DRAFT PAPER ON TACTICS FOR THE MEETING WITH THE PF IN NAIROBI AND FOR POSSIBLE STEPS FOLLOWING THE MEETING. THE MAJOR POINT OF LENGTHY DISCUSSION INVOLVED THE QUESTION OF HOW WE PROCEED IF THE MEETING WITH THE PF BREAKS DOWN. THE BRITISH AT FIRST SEEMED INCLINED TO REGARD AN UNSUCCESSFUL NAIROBI MEETING AS THE SUBSTANTIVE END OF OUR INITIATIVE WITH THE ONLY RECOURSE TO LAY OUR PROPOSALS BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE ARGUED THAT AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE PF, THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO MAKE A PRESENTATION TO THE FRONTLINE STATES WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE OUR PROPOSALS IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND EXPRESS OUR BELIEF THAT WE COULD NOT, WITHOUT THEIR ASSISTANCE, CARRY THEM FURTHER. ONLY AFTER HAVING THEIR REACTION WOULD WE CONSIDER PRESENTING THE DOCUMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE TACTICS OF THIS ALTERNATIVE REMAIN UNAGREED, THE BRITISH IN THE END SEEMED PERSUADED BY OUR ARGUMENTS.

2. WE THEN SPENT TWO HOURS WITH DAVID OWEN WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM BRUSSELS. HE AGREED THAT IF THE NAIROBI CONFIDENTIAL

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MEETING ENDS WITH LITTLE SUCCESS, THEN WE MUST TAKE THE PROBLEM TO THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS. HE ALSO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESENT THEM WITH A NARRATIVE OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON OUR PROPOSALS AND A SERIES OF ANNEXES INCLUDING THE PLAN FOR THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY, THE TRANSITIONAL AND INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS, THE PLAN FOR THE UN ROLE (INCLUDING RELATIONSHIP TO THE POLICE), AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANCILLARY BODIES. OWEN IS IN FAVOR OF "PUBLISHING ALL" AND AGREED WITH US THAT A STATEMENT ON THE PROPOSALS AND A HISTORY OF OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THEM SHOULD FORM THE CENTERPIECE. HE ASKED THE FCO TO BEGIN PREPARING A DRAFT IMMEDIATELY.

3. I THEN RAISED WHAT I SAW AS THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OUR EFFORT TO PRESENT A REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. FIRST, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PF AS WELL AS FOR NYERERE AND MACHEL THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF GENUINE BLACK PARTICI-

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PATION WHICH JUSTIFIES THE DECISION TO STOP THE WAR.  
SECOND, THE PF'S DEMANDS REPRESENT A LEGITIMATE ASPIRA-  
TION FOR INDEPENDENCE BUT OUR PROPOSALS DEPEND ON THE  
WORD OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AS THE ONLY GUARANTEE THAT  
INDEPENDENCE WILL IRREVERSIBLY FOLLOW A SETTLEMENT.  
BOTH OWEN AND CARVER AGREED THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES WERE  
BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESENTATIONAL. CARVER, HOWEVER,  
SAID THAT ONCE THE CONCEPT OF A VISIBLE TRANSFER OF  
AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, ONE THEN OPENS THE EXPLOSIVE  
QUESTION OF WHOM TO REMOVE AND WHOM TO APPOINT. WHILE  
A VISIBLE TURN-OVER IS DESIRABLE, THE OBJECT OF THE  
TRANSITION IS TO LEAVE MUCH OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE  
SO THAT A NEW, ELECTED AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE  
CHANGES AS IT SEES FIT.

4. OWEN ALSO AGREED THESE CONCERNS WERE VALID AND HAD  
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BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE OTHER NATIONALISTS AS WELL. IT UNFORTUNATELY REOPENS THE DILEMMA OF POWER-SHARING THAT CAUSED GENEVA TO FAIL. HE IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CONCEPT OF A VISIBLE TRANSFER BUT, HE SAID, THE WHITE PAPER WAS DESIGNED BECAUSE WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR REAL AFRICAN PARTICIPATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PAPER WHICH SPELLS OUT THE COMPOSITION AND FUNCTION OF THE TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO CONTAIN A HISTORY OF EARLIER EFFORTS TO EXPAND AN AFRICAN POLITICAL ROLE IN THE TRANSITION.

5. I DID NOT WANT TO BELABOR THE POINT BUT SAID THAT OUR PROPOSALS IN EFFECT TURN BACK THE CLOCK TO A STRAIGHTFORWARD COLONIAL SITUATION WHICH THE NATIONALIST FIND HARD TO ACCEPT. I AGREED THAT WHILE THE PROBLEM IS LARGEMLY PRESENTATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IS IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL, BUT, I ACKNOWLEDGED, THERE SEEMS NO OTHER WAY AROUND THE POWERSHARING PROBLEM ON WHICH THE 1976 GENEVA CONFERENCE BROKE UP. WE AGREED THAT WE MUST BEAR THIS IN MIND AS WE APPROACH NAIROBI.

6. WE ALSO AGREED TO RELATED STEPS TO BE TAKEN WITH OTHER PARTIES BEFORE THE NAIROBI MEETING: A) INFORM MUZOREWA (CHICKEREMA) AND SITHOLE (GABELLAH) OF THE PURPOSE OF OUR MEETING WITH THE PF; B) BRIEF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL ON OUR OBJECTIVES FOR THE MEETING; C) SEND A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN TO PRESIDENT MACHEL WHICH RECOGNIZES HIS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE (OWEN READILY AGREED TO THIS); D) SEND A MESSAGE TO SMITH INFORMING HIM OF THE MEETING AND REITERATING OUR BELIEF THAT AN EVENTUAL MEETING BETWEEN SMITH AND THE PF MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK  
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OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

7. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SLIGHT ON DECISIONS, THE MEETING WITH OWEN WENT WELL. AGAIN HE CHANGED THE TONE IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PESIMISTIC APPROACH EARLIER OUT-LINED IN THE FCO DRAFT PAPER. BOTH HE AND CARVER RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS WE FACE IN CONVINCING THE PF AS WELL AS THE FRONTLINE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL INDEED REPRESENT A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER AND AUTHORITY AND WILL BE SEEN AS SUCH BY THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE.

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## Message Attributes

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